Allowing Russia to rebuild the Soviet Union would have dire consequences for Europe. On March 18, 2025, in a speech before the German parliament, chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz declared, “This is a war against Europe, not just a war against Ukraine's territorial integrity.” His remarks were part of a broader appeal for substantial defense and infrastructure funding, bolstered by a firm commitment to do “whatever it takes” to protect freedom and peace.
While Merz and his European colleagues understand the stakes, recent history suggests they may not fully grasp the extent of Russia’s possible maneuvers. As in any strategic contest, failing to see the bigger picture risks implementing solutions that are insufficiently deep or far-reaching. If Russia is allowed to regroup after Ukraine, the long-term consequences could be far more severe than anticipated, potentially involving countries currently beyond the immediate reach of Moscow’s invading forces—countries that were once part of the Soviet Union.
European leaders may argue that they are not directly responsible for the security of states outside their immediate sphere. However, ignoring the significance of the Caucasus, Central Asia, Belarus, and Moldova to Europe’s future would be a grave mistake.
If Putin reasserts control over these nations, he would gain access to fresh military recruits and resources, strengthening his position for future conflicts in Europe. Here is how this scenario could unfold:
If Ukraine is defeated and Putin frames it as a victory, his broader ambitions will be emboldened, justifying further aggression. Once regrouped, his immediate priority would be reassembling the Soviet Union. Some targets would fall quickly. Belarus is already firmly within Moscow’s grip, and President Lukashenko, under mounting internal pressure, is unlikely to resist becoming a founding member of a new USSR.
Annexing Armenia would be similarly straightforward. The country has long been under Russian influence, and Prime Minister Pashinyan has made no meaningful effort to challenge Moscow’s dominance since taking office in 2018. If he resists, Russia could easily replace him, given his low approval ratings.
With Armenia secured, Georgia would be next. Although its public is largely pro-Western, the ruling "Georgian Dream" party leans toward Russia. Facing military pressure from both the north and south, Georgia’s leadership would have little choice but to submit. Azerbaijan might initially resist due to strong ties with Turkey and Israel, but this would only delay the inevitable. Russia, potentially in collaboration with Iran, could destabilize Azerbaijan by exploiting its ethnic minorities’ longstanding demands for autonomy.
The Central Asian republics stand little chance against Putin’s influence. Kazakhstan, with its vast, indefensible 4,700-mile border with Russia, would fall swiftly, either through military force or political coercion. The remaining Central Asian nations—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—would likely follow due to internal corruption, economic dependency on Russia, and weak governance. The Collective Security Treaty Organization would become the framework binding these nations into Putin’s war effort in Europe, with economic reintegration following swiftly.
To prevent this nightmarish scenario, a much stronger military response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is essential. While the proposed European defense budget will modernize military capabilities, it does little to address Ukraine’s immediate battlefield challenges. Fortunately for Europe, Ukraine now has the continent’s largest and most battle-hardened army. Supporting it fully is the best way to contain Russia without putting European troops on the ground—an option likely to be far more acceptable to European public opinion.
Russia’s economy is also vulnerable, and undermining its war funding should be a top priority. Sanctions must be tightened, loopholes closed, and pressure applied to countries aiding Russia’s sanction evasion. Additionally, frozen Russian financial assets in European institutions should be considered for wartime use.
Finally, countering Russia requires defeating it in its own game: soft power. Moscow’s strategic assets and influence in neighboring countries must become fair targets for countermeasures. This includes supporting pro-Western opposition movements, intensifying media and propaganda efforts, and expanding intelligence-sharing to disrupt Russian operations across Europe and the former Soviet republics.
The risk to Europe grows exponentially if Putin finds an ally in President Trump, who has previously signaled a revisionist stance on Ukrainian sovereignty. However, allowing Russia to rebuild the Soviet Union would pose an even greater threat. Stopping Putin now demands not only conventional military and economic strategies but also innovative, unconventional approaches to contain his imperial ambitions before they become an irreversible reality.
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