Ukraine had the chance to support an anti-Putin movement in Kursk but didn’t— and that was a mistake. (Opinion)

 

Russian opposition fighters were prepared to establish an alternative political presence in Kursk, yet Ukraine never engaged these willing allies. After six months of operations on Russian soil, Ukraine’s General Staff announced on March 15 the withdrawal from Sudzha, their primary stronghold in the region, to “more advantageous positions.” With Ukraine now maintaining only a minimal presence in Kursk Oblast, the operation has effectively concluded, necessitating a clear evaluation of its impact.

The Kursk campaign highlighted a stark contrast: Ukrainian soldiers displayed exceptional courage and tactical expertise at the brigade level, while strategic planning at the highest military-political echelons fell short. This misalignment transformed what could have been a strategic victory into an extended raid lacking substantial military or political gains.

This pattern is not new. Previous incursions into Russian territory led by Ukrainian military intelligence garnered headlines but yielded minimal operational impact while depleting elite personnel.

The misuse of these specialized intelligence operatives—trained for covert information gathering—as conventional combat units exposed coordination issues between military branches and strategic command.

The Kursk operation marked a significant escalation in both ambition and execution. Its initial success in penetrating Russian defenses and securing territory showcased Ukraine’s tactical prowess. However, this success also underscored critical strategic and political oversights. The operation advanced without clear answers to essential questions: What constituted victory? How would forces withdraw? What contingencies were in place for Russian counteractions?

The Anti-Putin Russia That Never Was

Ukraine failed to achieve its objectives of drawing Russian forces from other fronts and gaining negotiation leverage. With limited military resources, Ukraine could only execute the initial phase of an operation resembling the “deep operations doctrine” developed by Soviet theorists in the 1930s, lacking the capacity for follow-through.

The Russian General Staff responded with calculated deliberation, recognizing Ukraine’s limitations. Rather than weakening other front sections, they methodically assembled blocking forces from internal military districts before building offensive capabilities. The failure to secure the village of Korenevo proved particularly costly, enabling Russia to strike Ukraine’s left flank and ultimately compromise the operation.

This tactical setback highlighted broader strategic issues. Ukraine’s political leadership never articulated a coherent strategic vision for the incursion. The absence of clear communication created an impression of reactive tactics rather than a deliberate strategy, suggesting an impromptu attempt to seize the initiative on a limited front.

Perhaps most significantly, Ukraine failed to establish an alternative political presence on captured Russian territory.

The Russian Volunteer Corps and Chechen volunteer units—natural allies for such an initiative—were marginalized instead of being integrated into the operation.

Despite Russian opposition figures and volunteer formations expressing readiness to support this approach, Ukrainian intelligence never launched the necessary political initiative to create anti-Putin administrative structures in liberated territory.

Rather than Ukraine leveraging this opportunity, Russia capitalized on the situation by introducing North Korean military units to the war—a significant escalation that further complicated Ukraine’s strategic position.

Intelligence Gaps Left Ukraine Unprepared for Russia’s Response

The Kursk operation exposed critical shortcomings in Ukrainian intelligence at the strategic level. Effective intelligence should provide leadership with reliable insights into enemy plans and intentions, enabling informed decision-making through rigorous analysis of available data.

Ukrainian intelligence agencies’ failure to anticipate the Russian-North Korean offensive in late February and early March 2025 exemplifies this weakness.

Their focus on tactical “deep strikes” into Russian territory appears to have diverted resources from essential strategic intelligence, compromising Ukraine’s ability to analyze evolving threats.

Strategic planning should have accounted for Russian offensive potential in Kursk, their likely pace of advance, and the broader geopolitical context, including U.S. political transitions and President Trump’s stance on resolving the war.

A key opportunity was missed to preemptively withdraw from Kursk—employing Russia’s own “gesture of goodwill” tactic—which could have weakened Russia’s negotiating position following any subsequent aggression.

Instead, Ukraine lost valuable time and initiative in an area where it had maintained a proactive posture for six months. Nevertheless, the operation produced meaningful results: Russia’s military reputation suffered significantly, and Ukrainian forces experienced a morale boost in the operation’s initial phase. 

Ukrainian troops demonstrated their combat effectiveness precisely when allies questioned Ukraine’s military sustainability and continued support remained uncertain. As a result, the Kursk operation became a pivotal moment for Ukrainian diplomacy to continue advocating effectively on the international stage.

Ultimately, the Kursk operation stands as both a tactical achievement and a strategic lesson—highlighting the consequences of missed opportunities, inadequate forecasting, and the need for Ukraine’s political leadership to respond with greater flexibility to military successes.